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ESSAY
PROPERTY OUTLAWS, REBEL MYTHOLOGIES,
AND SOCIAL BANDITS
Greg Lastowka*
INTRODUCTION
In Property Outlaws,' Eduardo Pefialver and Sonia Katyal challenge
our intuitions about individuals and groups who violate legal property
entitlements. They argue that actions like intentional conversion, in-
fringement, and trespass may be legal wrongs, but they are not always
harmful to the society.2 Instead, the authors argue that violating property
laws can be socially and legally productive in a variety of ways.3 For
that reason, property outlaws deserve greater respect and solicitude from
the legal establishment.
To support this somewhat counterintuitive claim, the authors offer a
range of stories from a variety of contexts, involving the intentional vio-
lation of legal property entitlements.4 In the vast majority of the cases
they present, the so-called "outlaws" feel fully justified in their illegal
actions.5 The outlaws we see depicted are not criminals but protesters,
activists, and homeless squatters.6
Pefialver and Katyal hope to "rehabilitate, at least to a certain ex-
tent, the image of the intentional property outlaw"7 by offering a sys-
temic account of laudable outlawry. More specifically, the authors seem
interested in creating greater legal leeway for those who violate property
laws.8 They also seek to increase legal theorists' and policy makers'
general appreciation of the social benefits provided by outlaws.9
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law. I would like to thank Leafan Rosen for her
superior research assistance.
1 EDUARDO MOIStS PEfqALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS 11 (2010).
The book builds upon an earlier law review article with the same title by the same authors,
Eduardo Pefialver and Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 12.
6 Id. at 13,
7 Id. at 11.
8 See id.
9 See id.
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The book is both ambitious and fascinating. The outlaw's construc-
tive role in both law and politics is a topic that has received too little
attention. This book brings the topic to life, with both careful theoretical
inquiries and a multitude of examples from recent history.
I cannot respond here to all the interesting questions and assertions
found in Property Outlaws (and I should also note that there have already
been some published reactions to the arguments made in the bookI0 ), so I
will limit my reactions to four. At the outset, I should say that I agree
with a great deal in the book. But, rather than summarize the many ways
in which I agree with the authors, I will focus primarily on four points
where my own perspective leads me to slightly different conclusions.
I. THE IMAGE OF THE OUTLAW
In their introductory material, Pefialver and Katyal explain that they
hope to rehabilitate the image of the outlaw. 1 At first glance, this seems
like an ambitious goal.12 Outlaws, we might imagine, should not be pop-
ular figures. Yet, on closer consideration, I would argue that the "image
of the intentional property outlaw" is really not so tarnished. Indeed, my
sense is that we have a certain level of attraction to outlaws of all sorts-
at least when they keep their distance from our daily lives-and that this
fascination informs Property Outlaws and contributes to its narratives.
As historians have explain, the term "outlaw" once had a different
meaning than it does today.13 In medieval England outlaw was a precise
legal term of art with specific consequences.' 4 Outlaw designated a per-
son who failed to stand trial and became a fugitive from the law.' 5 Soci-
ety characterized such a person as caput lupinum-bearing the head of
the wolf (in legal Latin)-and wanted, dead or alive. 16 An outlaw could
10 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Response, Order with Outlaws?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNuMBRA 269 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Fennell.pdf; Nicole
Stelle Garnett, Response, Property In-Laws, 156 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 279 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Garnett.pdf; Elizabeth M. Glazer, Response,
Rule Of (Out)Law: Property's Contingent Right to Exclude, 156 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA
331 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/01-2008/Glazer.pdf; Laura S. Underkuf-
fler, Response, Lessons from Outlaws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 262 (2007), http://
www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Underkuffler.pdf.
11 PEf4ALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 1-20.
12 Underkuffler, supra note 10, at 262 ("[T]he overwhelming image of property law-
breakers is negative.").
13 See Desmond Manderson, From Hunger to Love: Myths of the Source, Interpretation,
and Constitution of Law in Children's Literature, 15 CARDozo STUD. L. & LrrERATURE 87,
104 (2003).
14 Id.
15 Id
16 Id
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be murdered with impunity by any member of society, creating a state-
endorsed radical inversion of the social contract.17
Today, however, we use the term outlaw to describe generally those
who violate legal rules in a determined way. Accoringly, Pefilalver and
Katyal define "property outlaws" as people who act in ways that fail to
conform to legal rules concerning property rights. Their stories of out-
laws, however, focus on those who disobey a property law in a nonvio-
lent manner and out of a political conviction that the rule they are
violating is, in fact, an illegitimate rule.' 8 These are, I think, somewhat
mild outlaws compared to the historic English fugitive.
They are also a rather mild sort compared to the rogues gallery of
outlaw types that popular media presents to us on a daily basis. On tele-
vision we can find serial killers, criminal masterminds, pirates, thugs,
escaped prisoners, and even kind-hearted comedic protaganists that wind
up, by no fault of their own, pursued by lines of police cars. We all
know and admire some of these outlaws. A very short list of outlaws
(factual and fictional) who I have admired (to some degree) would in-
clude Spartacus, Robin Hood, Grace O'Malley, Jean Valjean, Pancho
Villa, Billy the Kid, Bonnie and Clyde, Michael Corleone, Thelma and
Louise, Captain Jack Sparrow, Omar Little, and Jake Sully. No doubt
your personal list includes others.
My favorite childhood outlaws were a fictional band from a galaxy
far, far away. The first three Star Wars stories were a classic tale of
outlaw resistance, mashing up themes of the European resistance fighters
in World War II (smugglers vs. Stormtroopers) with student counter-cul-
ture of the 1960s (young, idealistic rebels tapping into the force). Leia,
Luke, and Han joined the Rebel Alliance and became outlaws defying
what passed for law and order in their corner of the universe. Their ex-
ploits culminated in the complete destruction of two rather expensive
pieces of imperial property. Now that I am slightly more mature, I real-
ize the spectacles of technology and violence that attended the operations
of the Rebel Alliance were probably a large part of why I found the
trilogy, and its outlaw characters, so engrossing. Outlaws are very excit-
ing figures. Personally, I rarely use deadly weapons, flee armed pursu-
ers, or break into buildings. Yet most outlaws, given their poor relations
with the state, conveniently need to do these sorts of visually exciting
and pulse-quickening things.
In the early English era of outlaws, the outlaw was often fleeing
from the possibility of being a key player in a public spectacle of dis-
memberment or execution. Ironically, in today's age of mass incarcera-
17 Id.
18 See PE&ALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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tion, the public derives enjoyment from the spectacle of the outlaw's
crime, not the outlaw's punishment. And so, we find ourselves cheering
for young and energetic celebrities on the screen who play assassins,
rogue spies, vampires, gangsters, and pirates engaged in all sorts of
things that we find fascinating and terrifying-and that are, by and large,
illegal.
The appeal of the outlaw story is not all about the spectacle of the
outlaw life though. The outlaw's psychology is probably just as impor-
tant. The outlaw that we imagine is a truly free individual. Living a
hunted existence, the outlaw is at liberty to come up with a social code
from scratch. While the creative industries frequently seek to commer-
cially exploit this license by feeding us gruesome fantasies of criminal
sadism,19 they also explain that some outlaws, like the Rebel Alliance,
can exist above, rather than below, the moral bar of the status quo. Al-
though we see an abundance of outlaw villains, the outlaw hero-the
rebel against tyranny-is really the perennial favorite, with Robin Hood
being the classic example and Avatar's Jake Sully being one of the more
recent incarnations. These idealistic and self-sacrificing outlaws find
themselves in violent conflict with state authorities due to their devotion
to justice.
To make this plot work, however, it is not enough to make the noble
outlaw self-sacrificing and good. In order to create a spectacle, the state
must be firmly allied with evil. All of King John's supporters and hench-
men must be cruel thugs, the Stormtroopers must be soulless automotons,
and so forth. Only then can special-effects professionals do their work,
providing explosions, weapons, and mayhem in a way that is more or
less morally palatable. Of course, when we wake up from these fanta-
sies, we should realize that the perfectly noble outlaw and the perfectly
villainous state are exceedingly rare occurences. So the noble and vio-
lent outlaw narrative, which requires the concurrence of these two, is
nearly statistically impossible.
And yet, the Robin Hood myth persists. The historian Eric Hob-
sbawm, in his 1969 book, Bandits, provided a compelling cross-cultural
account of what he termed the phenomenon of the "social bandit," the
popular outlaw figure.20 Hobsbawm saw the outlaw as a sort of peasant
proto-revolutionary, defying the oppressive and illegitimate state, while
drawing popular support and admiration from the local (agrarian and im-
19 Jenny McCartney, The Dark Knight Taints Our Children's World View, TELEGRAPH,
July 26, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comnment/columnists/charlesmoore/3560989/The-
Dark-Knight-taints-our-childrens-world-view.html (commenting on the latest Batman movie,
The Dark Knight, and noting that for a film marketed to young children, "the greatest surprise
of all-even for me, after eight years spent working as a film critic-has been the sustained
level of intensely sadistic brutality throughout the film").
20 ERIc HOBSBAWM, BANDITS (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 4th ed. 2000) (1969).
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poverished) community. Drawing from Asia, Africa, South America,
and the Mediterranean, Hobsbawm's book provided a range of accounts
of popular outlaws who inspired songs and folklore.21
Although Hobsbawm's account of social bandits is historical, it
moves rather lightly between the outlaws of fact and the outlaws of folk-
lore. In folk stories, Hobsbawm tells us, the social bandit opposes injus-
tice, aids the powerless against the powerful, supports the poor against
the rich, and defends the rights of the local community.22 These condi-
tions, as often as not, are not met in fact. But the community that sings
the praises of its outlaw figures, much like Hollywood, is perfectly will-
ing to bend the facts and fill in some missing details. 23
I think we can conclude, based on Hobsbawm's work and the con-
tinued prevalence of outlaws in the media, that our public image problem
with outlaws is really not so much the problem of underappreciation, but
of overappreciation (albeit at a distance). Culturally, we seem to yearn
for stories of noble outlaws in pulse-quickening resistance against op-
pressive states. We cannot stop telling tales of young, poor, talented,
passionate, clever, idealistic, and defiant individuals resisting an author-
ity that is violent, corrupt, humorless, alien, imperialist, and, most impor-
tantly, unjust. The outlaw narrative grabs us and permeates world
culture.
Accordingly, I would offer a slight modification to the goal of the
authors. The popular image of the outlaw is really not all that bad, nor
has it ever been. The real challenge in the legal study of outlaws, I
would say, is in taking our popular enthusiasm for outlaws and using it to
say something constructive about our political process, especially in the
modem era of representative democracy and the complex administrative
state.
II. DEFINING THE MODERN OUTLAW
Eric Hobsbawm's social bandits, to the extent they are rooted in
factual history, tend to dwell on the borders of state power.24 Bands of
popular outlaws, Hobsbawm tells us, emerge primarily in times of fam-
ine and political crisis for the obvious reasons that robbery provides a
workable alternative to starvation, especially in times when the state's
police power is weakened by an unstable government.25
Yet most of Hobsbawm's outlaw stories take place in past centuries.
He identifies barely any outlaws operating in the later part of the twenti-
21 See id. at 46-62.
22 Id. at 47-48.
23 Id. at 46-49 (contrasting the actual bandit with the archetypal bandit).
24 See id. at 34-35.
25 Id. at 26.
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eth century. Part of Hobsbawm's thesis is, in fact, that the golden age of
the social bandit has ended.26 True popular outlaws in the style of Robin
Hood, according to Hobsbawm, were tied to traditional agrarian peasant
cultures. 27 They generally do not arise, he says, in modem industrial
states.28 Hobsbawm's book was published in 1969.29 Today's digital
age, where everyone and everything is wired, logged, and tracked, is an
even worse fit for independent bands of mountain and forest-dwelling
outlaws protected and supported by local communities.
So while Pefialver and Katyal's more modem outlaws are themati-
cally connected to the outlaws of Hobsbawm and fiction, they are, of
necessity, different sorts of outlaws. Perhaps the most celebrated out-
laws in the book are the young African-American students who organ-
ized lunch counter sit-ins in the segregated South during the early
1960s.30 In addition to their stories, we hear stories about the Native-
American activists who occupied Alcatraz Island in the late 1960s,31 the
AIDS activists who sought to defy international patent laws to procure
life-saving drugs for South Africans, 32 the nineteenth century squatter-
pioneers of the American frontier, 33 and a variety of digital downloaders
and "hacktivists" who have challenged copyright law. 3 4
These nonfictional "outlaws" do share some important characteris-
tics with Hobsbawm's bandits. For instance, Hobsbawm's outlaws are
often robbers of the rich who are adopted by an oppressed peasantry.3 5
Pefialver and Katyal's outlaws create "redistributive value" while pro-
moting the interest of disadvantaged communities. 36 Both sorts claim to
engage in the pursuit of justice, though they use different strategies.
Most importantly, the outlaws featured by Pefialver and Katyal avoid
physical violence. It follows that, given their nonviolent tactics, the out-
laws of Pefialver and Katyal are fairly powerless against the violent
forces of the state. Hobsbawm's social bandits effectively evade state
power, at least for a few years, while Pefialver and Katyal's outlaws
seem to anticipate the probability of state punishment in exchange for the
possibility that their actions will influence public opinion.
Yet, although the exemplary outlaws in the book seem fit to a cer-
tain type, the abstract figure used for the outlaw is considerably broader.
26 See id. at 144.
27 See id. at 143-44.
28 Id. at 144, 184.
29 Id.
30 PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 64-70.
31 Id. at vii-viii.
32 Id. at 93-97.
33 Id. at 55-63.
34 Id. at 169-82, 84-86.
35 HOBSBAWM, supra note 20, at 20.
36 PERALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 127.
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The authors divide their field of outlaws into two primary groups.3 7 On
one hand are "expressive outlaws," those who violate the law primarily
to make a political statement. 38 On the other hand are "acquisitive out-
laws," those who seek to materially benefit from legal property trans-
gressions. 39 Pefialver and Katyal also distinguish between outlaws who
knowingly break clearly established rules, and "altlaws" who break-or
contest-certain interpretations of less firmly settled laws.4 0
These categories, as the authors concede, are not divided by clear
and bright lines.4 1 The settler-squatters of the frontier are described as
acquisitive outlaws, yet they defend their actions in the language of polit-
ical philosophy, stressing their productive labor and personal connection
to the land. 4 2 They contrast their sweat equity and pioneer spirit with the
speculative and remote involvement of the ostensible owners, wealthy
Eastern speculators. 4 3 So their acquisitive behavior is perhaps also
expressive.
By dividing the field of outlaws into acquisitive and expressive sorts
of outlaws and altlaws, Pefialver and Katyal structure their analysis of
these sorts more easily (for example, one can compare the category of
acquistive altlaws with expressive outlaws). They also make it easy to
apply further dualistic frameworks to these groups (for example, retribu-
tive and deterrent approaches can be applied to acquisitive or expressive
outlaws and altiaws)."
I appreciate the utility of coming up with these various subsets of
property outlaws; however, I worry that these abstract categories have a
tendency to drift a bit from the specific examples that seem to interest the
authors. If the goal of the book is really to discuss property lawbreakers
generally, the cast of outlaws should include a few more villains mixed
in with the heroes. For instance, I think most law professors know at
least one student who left a laptop unattended in a library and returned to
find it missing. Since the Code of Hammurabi and the Eighth Com-
mandment, rulers have been making rules targeted at punishing this sort
of acquisitive property outlawry. Hobsbawm's social bandits may be
vanishing today, but the common thief still exists.
37 Id. at 16.
38 Id. at 16-17.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 17-18. The "altlaws" are more closely associated with intellectual property
violations. Id. at 80.
41 Id. at 17, 80.
42 Id. at 55-63.
43 Id. at 58-59.
44 See id. at 125-42.
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If the book is really about all property outlaws, as the authors
claim, 4 5 Pef1alver and Katyal stack the deck by offering us the outlaw
protester,46 the homeless squatter,47 Jean Valjean stealing bread for the
children, 48 and the politicized hacker.49 The majority of nonviolent
property outlaws are probably the shoplifters of the world. Are they also
in need of image rehabilitation? Do they provide the same sorts of social
benefits that the book's noble outlaws provide? If not, the abstract class
of outlaws and altlaws seems a bit too broad.
My second concern is that the law itself may really play a signifi-
cantly smaller part than we imagine in our understanding of the outlaw
and the outlaw's productive role in law. From the standpoint of the prop-
erty professor or the lawyer, it may seem that those who don't obey the
formal laws of property are outlaws. Instead, I would say, from the pop-
ular perspective, the outlaws are normal people, and we are punctilious
lawyers.
If a property outlaw is simply someone who fails to follow the letter
of property law, the majority of people are property outlaws. After all,
how could the nonlawyer fathom the modern doctrine of property? Each
year, I spend a semester trying to introduce the basics of servitudes, ad-
verse possession, encroachments, nuisance, etc. to law students who are
truly motivated to learn about these doctrines. Every year, I see that
students are amazed to encounter the legal rules that ostensibly govern
their property relations with others.
Indeed, about once a year, a student in my property law class asks
me if entering a neighbor's lawn to retrieve a poorly thrown ball or fris-
bee constitutes a legal wrong (no doubt, my introduction to trespass law
calls to their minds some painful memory of an angry neighbor or a lost
chattel). And at about the same rate, I get a question about the legal
status of a chattel left behind by an acquaintence a few years ago. Does a
rule exist regarding the use of the thing or a requirement to effectuate its
return? What I find most endearing about these sorts of questions is that
they are so peculiar to first-year law students. I imagine these students
have never before, and perhaps will never again, inquire into the state's
formal opinion about overthrown frisbees and lost bracelets.
Robert Ellickson famously observed, in his study of property law on
the ground, that even in cases where land use is vitally important to a
person's livelihood, often the affected populace is really not very famil-
45 Id. at 15 (noting that the category includes "actors . . . whose ends we find
reprehensible").
46 Id. at 64 (discussing the lunch counter sit-in movement of the 1960's).
47 Id. at 13 (discussing the settlers of the American frontier).
48 Id. at 9.
49 Id. at 84 (discussing "hacktivists" who believe that "[a]ll information should be free").
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iar with formal property rules.50 Social custom can easily diverge from
the rules of property law, yet people will somehow manage to get by.51
So while the "outlaws" identified in the book may be, from the law-
yer's perspective, outlaws, they may also be, from their own perspec-
tives, simply ordinary people with unusually strong convictions.
Purposeful outlaws of this exact sort are unusual because they actually
have some correct sense of what formal property law demands, some
concurrent conviction that the legal rule fails to accord with justice, and
some hope that society will benefit by their open and nonviolent defiance
of the law. And, just like the outlaws of fiction, these sorts of outlaws
require a foil in the form of a community that fails to recognize their
demands for justice.
Without such a foil, a lawbreaker's conflict with the formal law may
go unnoticed, even by the lawbreaker. On most days, if one steps on a
neighbor's lawn to retrieve a ball or drives fifty-nine in a fifty-five mile-
per-hour zone, this may be a legal violation, but it is a violation con-
doned by social norms. Where social norms create a working, albeit for-
mally illegal, system, the state will not need to intervene. The outlaws
celebrated by Pefialver and Katyal do not just violate property laws that
they dislike; they challenge opposing stakeholders who feel justified in
seeking state aid to enforce the contested property rule. Hobsbawm un-
derstood his bandits as proto-revolutionaries. Pefialver and Katyal's
property outlaws are somewhat similar. They do not simply defy formal
property laws-they engage in political action.
To summarize, the abstract outlaw in Property Outlaws is a vague
figure, yet the stories focus on a narrow subset of property outlaws: those
who are idelogically motivated and who seek legal transformation. The
much more general class of intentional lawbreakers is in tension with the
examples of outlawry offered for our approval. This gap complicates the
themes of the book somewhat because our admiration for those who en-
gage in willful civil disobedience diverges somewhat radically from our
opinion of both criminal pickpockets, as well as our general lack of con-
cern for those who fail to obey obscure or unenforced laws.
III. OUTLAWS AS REDISTRIBUTORS
In their effort to rehabilitate the general image of property outlaws
and in their argument against a perfect system of deterrence, Pefialver
and Katyal claim that outlawry can provide society with two important
benefits. The first of these benefits is "redistributive value," and the sec-
50 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHoUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SErrLE DisPuTEs
48-64 (1991).
51 See id. at 52-64.
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ond is "information value."5 2 In this section, I will explain my concerns
about the concept of "redistributive value."
The argument here is that outlaws create greater social equity and
fairness by intentionally transferring ownership from the property rich to
the property poor (i.e., themselves).53 Pefialver and Katyal suggest that
these intentional violations of property interests can be socially legiti-
mate in some circumstances. Specifically, where the property rich enjoy
a surplus illegitimately, depriving them of that surplus by means of an
appropriative transfer creates a social benefit.54 The authors reference in
the introduction the classic Jean Valjean example with the starving out-
law stealing food to save himself and the lives of others.55 In such cases,
while theft is a violation of property law, our norms deem it excusable.
Indeed, most of us, I would think, might recognize some nonlegal obliga-
tion on the part of the wealthly to share food with those who are starving
in their presence.56
So, in essence, the redistributive Robin Hood robs from the property
rich to give to the property poor, which in some cases is the Robin Hood
in question. Interestingly, unlike Hobsbawm, Pefialver and Katyal do not
seek to evaluate Robin Hood against a background of revolutionary polit-
ical theory. Instead, they see Robin Hood as a potenitally useful admin-
istrative tool. Robin Hoods can help achieve the sort of baseline
requirements that society generally thinks the social welfare state ought
to provide.
As Pefialver and Katyal point out, the law is not entirely inimical to
this sort of acquisitive appropriation. In some cases, the law may actu-
ally treat those who intentionally violate property rights favorably. Doc-
trines such as adverse possession, acquiescence, and necessity effectively
validate certain acquisitive appropriations.57
In Chapter Three of their book, Pefialver and Katyal provide one
story of this sort of acquisitive redistribution: the settler-squatters on the
United States frontier in the nineteenth century.58 This struggle pitted
local settler populations against distant speculators. 59 Though many of
the squatting settlers were initially, legally speaking, trespassers, they
appealled to doctrines such as adverse possession to ultimately take own-
52 PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 127.
53 See id. at 128 ("[T]he consequentialist case for involuntary transfers of property can
be quite strong when there is reason to believe that the outlaw places a higher value on the
property in question than the true owner.").
54 See id.
55 See id. at 9
56 See id. at 134-35 (suggesting that such an obligation exists).
57 See id. at 147-58.
58 Id. at 55.
59 Id.
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ership of the land they invaded. 60 Chapter Three concludes by noting the
irony of how the settlers, who were originally branded as "shameless
lawbreakers and usurpers by eastern elites," ultimately became "the re-
vered pioneers of American mythology."61
The story of the popular triumph of the pioneer squatters, however,
is in tension with the story that introduces the book, the account of a
small group of activist Native Americans who occupied Alcatraz Island
and claimed legal possession of it.62 Ultimately, after a year and a half,
federal forces ousted these individuals. 63 Recalling the occupation of Al-
catraz helps us remember that the "revered pioneers of American mythol-
ogy" did not just oust wealthy land speculators, they also displaced
indigenous populations.64 Viewing the settlers from the vantage of the
Native Americans, I think, should make us more ambivalent about the
social desirability of outlaw redistributions.
The pioneer-squatters show that trespass can be legally constructive,
in the sense that particular appropriations may be ultimately endorsed by
the state, yet the story focuses primarily on local might making local
right.65 From the standpoint of an ideal democratic theory, the success of
local armed forces in making their own rules is not exactly inspiring.
Hobsbawm argues that local rural communities have often preferred their
local bandits to foreign occupiers, and the connection to the "revered"
pioneers is clear.66 Yet if redistributive justice is the goal, why should
we ever create a special space for rewriting property law through raw
power? Property outlawry as a redistributive solution only makes sense
when we can tell the Robin Hood story convincingly, and this, as men-
tioned before, is more common in fiction than fact.
Redistributive outlawry certainly exists. It exists as the inevitable
symptom of regimes that fail to provide for the poor. When people are
penniless and hungry, some will steal-though, just as importantly, some
won't. When people have no space to call their own, they must sleep
somewhere. We should not, however, praise these actions as strategies,
rather we should point to them as symptoms of regimes that deserve our
condemnation. Pefialver and Katyal do seem to recognize this because
they concede, at one point, that a functioning state works better than
60 Id. at 61.
61 Id. at 63.
62 Id. at vii-ix.
63 See generally TROY JOHNSON, THE OCCUPATION OF ALCATRAZ ISLAND (1996) (dis-
cussing the late-twentieth century Native American takeover of Alcatraz Island).
64 PIALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 15. The authors do not, however, acknowledge
this tension as much in Chapter Three as they do in their Introduction.
65 See Garnett, supra note 10, at 279. In responding to the authors' earlier article on
property outlaws, supra note 1, Garnett suggests that the frontier era was not so much about
assertive acquisition but anarchy.
66 See HOBSBAWM, supra note 20, at 20.
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outlaw justice at promoting "redistributive value." 67 However, they ar-
gue that when the state fails to protect its members, permitting the poor
to engage in theft and squatting is better than punishing them for feeding
themselves and occupying space in the world.68
This is right, I suppose. But it should be followed by an important
qualifier: any state that relies on modem-day Robin Hoods as a signifi-
cant source of redistributive value has clearly failed to meaningfully pro-
tect the interests of its citizens. The ideal state would surely use law
rather than outlawry as the optimal redistributive strategy.
IV. OUTLAW BEHAVIOR AS INFORMATION SIGNAL
The other key value Pefialver and Katyal identify with property out-
laws is "information value." 69 According to the authors, outlaws provide
lawmakers, and the general population, with "information value" by
sending a powerful signal about their evaluation of the legitimacy of
property rules.70 The lunch counter sit-ins and the Native-American oc-
cupation of Alcatraz are described as examples of preference expres-
sion.71 Before these property violations, the broader community was
unaware of the extent to which the disenfranchised group opposed the
status quo of property allocation.72 By breaking the rule, the outlaws
signaled their preferences directly and clearly. 73
As Pefialver and Katyal explain, the information provided by the
outlaw does not end with signaling personal preference because the out-
law action overcomes an "imaginative deficit" by allowing the public to
see the actual result of the proposed change.74 The Greensboro sit-ins
did not merely express a preference for integrated lunch counters, they
brought the desired situation into being. The reality of the new property
allocation could be observed rather than merely theorized.
Pefialver and Katyal are undoubtedly correct, I think, that outlaw
actions provide information value to society. They also recognize that a
sort of symbiotic relationship exists between the very fact that the actions
67 PEfiALVER & KATYAL, supra note 1, at 156-57 (suggesting that "government-spon-
sored redistribution and social insurance" are superior to common law doctrines such as "ad-
verse possession and necessity").
68 Id. at 157-58 ("[A]lithough a system of voluntary or mandatory redistribution may be
more efficient than distributive-minded changes in property law, it does not follow that self-
help is inferior to a highly unequal status quo and therefore not justified when adequate redis-
tribution is not forthcoming.").
69 Id. at 127.
70 Id. at 138-42.
71 Id. at 139.
72 Id. (noting that prior to the lunch-counter sit-ins, for example, the Jim Crow South
may have adhered to the "myth of black acquiescence [to] private segregation").
73 Id.
74 Id. at 141.
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are outlawed and the sort of information that outlaw action provides.75
The property outlaw sends a strong signal about preference because the
outlaw risks the consquences of open defiance to state authority (the
original "Greensboro Four" were reportedly menaced, on the first day of
their protest, by a police officer with a billy club).
The expressive outlaw here diverges importantly from Hobsbawm's
figure of the social bandit. Hobsbawm views the bandit as a primitive
revolutionary and expresses what seems like admiration for violent and
ineffective anarchist figures. A different, more Hobsbawmian version of
Property Outlaws might tell different stories. The featured property out-
laws of recent history might have included modem global anarchist
movements and some of the more militant student groups of the 1960s,
such as the Weather Underground. These are groups that have also vio-
lated property laws to express their political preferences. 76 By confining
their examples to outlaws engaging in peaceful civil disobedience, rather
than revolutionary violence, Pefialver and Katyal make their "informa-
tion value" claims much more palatable.
To the extent that property outlaws are peaceful actors violating
property entitlements in pursuit of their own sense of justice, we should
(and I think most of us do) admire them for their willingness to put their
own liberty at risk in an effort to reach the public mind. Peaceful civil
disobedience provides a shortcut, perhaps one like no other, toward the
political acceptance of superior visions of justice.
So if we cabin the claim of "information value" to these sorts of
outlaws, which I think we should, I would offer only one small point of
clarification. While peaceful civil disobedience can sometimes be he-
roic, it is ultimately a political tactic, not a strategy or a coherent philoso-
phy. And again, it is a tactic that works best in certain contexts. In an
ideal state, we would not seek to encourage most individuals to follow
their inner outlaw in lieu of other forms of political participation. In
some cases, where the strategy prevails, a nonviolent protester will be
popularly accepted, often in retrospect, as a heroic figure. In other cases,
this sort of outlaw will be simply misguided.
In a country where more than a quarter of the public declines to
vote, I do not think we are at great risk that many people will choose to
adopt outlaw tactics, preferring to be jailed to bring about political
change. I would venture, therefore, that peaceful civil disobedience
tends to be largely symptomatic of a failure of those who engage in it to
find an effective political voice in other forums. In such circumstances,
75 Id. at 139 (noting that "to legitimize, ex ante, the lawbreaker's activity would radically
undermine the expressive message itself').
76 Garnett, supra note 10, at 286 (noting that plenty of property outlaws use more violent
means).
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peaceful civil disobedience, whatever its outcome, can be viewed as no-
ble and desirable. Yet, when communities have significant political
power (or even the untapped potential to wield it) and the public sphere
is functioning well, there should be other ways, short of lawbreaking, to
communicate preferences and set forth visions of social progress.
CONCLUSION
Property Outlaws calls to our attention the important ways in which
those who violate the laws of property have managed to shape our soci-
ety, sometimes for the better, by acts of legal defiance. However, while
the book suggests that its topic encompasses all lawbreaking, the authors
clearly have the greatest admiration for outlaws who are nonviolent and
civic-minded. What I have suggested in these comments is that these
more palatable "outlaws" have something rather important in common
with their revolutionary relatives-their social utility is inversely propor-
tional to the tyranny of the law that they resist.
Outlaws shine when the laws they oppose are unjust. When a gov-
ernment is functioning effectively, outlaws should diminish, retiring into
history and fiction, where they can remain outlaws and continue to in-
spire us. Paradoxically, those governments that need outlaws the most
will be the least receptive to the arguments in this book about the bene-
fits of redistribution and preference information. Tyrants, like King John
or Avatar's RDA corporation are not much concerned about maximizing
social welfare or envisioning a more just society. The tyranical ruler is a
thief at heart.
The best way to reinvigorate the image of the property outlaw is to
identify various forms of contemporary injustice and celebrate those who
actively and peacefully oppose the majority's complacent commitment to
the legal status quo. These sorts of outlaws are still with us today, and
they still deserve our praise precisely because our laws are not perfectly
just. Like the authors, I believe our legal rules, including our property
rules, could be significantly fairer to those who have less.
Indeed, if we take the story of Robin Hood or Jean Valjean and
apply the United States in the international arena, I believe our collective
wealth and our military might should lead us to be especially cautious
about creating outlaw stories where we play a role analogous to the Ga-
lactic Empire. We should be especially attentive to the narratives spun
by those who challenge our power and legitimacy on the world stage.
The outlaw actions concerning the assertion of intellectual property
rights barring the distribution of inexpensive AIDS drugs, cited by
Pefialver and Katyal, are an excellent example of Robin Hood resistance.
The law often does not adequately respect the important and con-
structive role played by peacefully disobedient political activists.
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Pefialver and Katyal are right to point out that it should. When a coura-
geous few are willing to sacrifice their personal comfort and security in
pursuit of political justice and social progress, we should admire these
rare people. Indeed, in an better world, Hollywood would tell us their
outlaw stories more often.
The outlaws Pefialver and Katyal describe do indeed deserve greater
respect in the eyes of the law. And I would add that Pefialver and Katyal
deserve our respect as well, for calling our attention to the socially pro-
ductive role of outlaws in this important book.

